City of Milwaukee v. Illinois by Powell, Lewis F., Jr.
Washington and Lee University School of Law
Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons
Supreme Court Case Files Powell Papers
10-1980
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois
Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Water Law Commons
This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Powell Papers at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers, box 530/folder 9-13
--~- -
,.._,,,.,,,,,..~--- - --
~ ~~ ~~ 




f ~ 1s1 19Ro 
W-f>:rqember 21, 197"9 Conference 
List Y, Sheet~ 
No ~ ' 









et al o 
Cert to CA 7 
(Fairchild, Tone 
& Harper [S15JTY 
Federal/Civil 








1. SUMMARY: Petrs in No. 79-408 assert that 
(1) the federal common law of nuisance is preempted pro 
tanto, or at least sharply limited, by the Feder a 1 Water 
-IS 
C-;211 p ~,~ o/J ~ = ~ 
-a. v..£-,--1 /~fa_--:]; a__~se.._ /; 
<-;-~ 
~~~~~ 
~IAA-~~9--t,,e_ • .,J_,~, 
~.Lo~~ ~ 
~~w-1-oL~~ 
f ~ 1.s-1 19fo 
N-0:T.Jember 21, 19'7"9 
















Cert to CA 7 
(Fairchild, Tone 
& Harper [ sfilTY 
Feder a 1/Ci vil 








1. SUMMARY: Petrs in No. 79-408 assert that 
(1) the federal common law of nuisance is preempted pro 
tanto, or at least sharply limited, by the Federal Water 






Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (FWPCA) and the 
Clean Water Act of 1977; (2) CA 7's holding was unsupported 
by the evidence; and (3) personal jurisdiction and venue 
were lacking. Petr in No. 79-571 asserts that (1) CA 7's 
holding was unsupported by the evidence; (2) CA 7 should have 
~ I.__ 
considered petr 's state· law claims; and (3) CA 7 erred in 
construing federal common law as congruent with secondary 
treatment standards under the FWPCA. 
2. FACTS: This is a 
1
£ederal common law nuisance ,, 
action in which Illinois and Michigan sought to enjoin Milwaukee 
and its associated commissions (Milwaukee) from dumping sewage 
into Lake Michigan. Resp Illinois first sought to invoke this ---Court's original jurisdiction but was remitted to federal 
district court for reasons not here relevant. Illinois v. Cit_y 
of Milwaukee, 406 U .s. 91 (1972). The Court in City of Milwaukee 
found that resp had stated a claim under the federal common law of 
nuisance which was not preempted by existing statutes. But it 
noted that: 
[i]t may happen that new federal . laws 
and new federal regulations may in time 
pre-empt the field of federal common 
law of nuisance. 
406 U o S • , at 106 . 
Illinois thereupon refiled in the Northern District of 
Illinois, complaining that Milwaukee's sewage contained pathogens 
(disease-causing organisms) and phosphorus (a nutrient contributing 
to accelerated eutrophication, or aging, of Lake Michigan). Michi-
gan intervened as a plaintiff on the eutrophication issue only. 
-
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In 1977, after a 4-month trial, the DC (Bauer) found that JS)- c___ 
the discharges constituted a federal common law nuisance, ~ 
an Illinois common law nuisance, and a violation of the ~ 
- ~A. 
Illinois Environmental Protection Act. The DC entered an ~ 
order requiring (1) virtual elimination of all raw and 
combined (raw and storm runoff) overflows, and (2) treatment 
sufficient to achieve specified effluent limitations. ~ ~ 
Milwaukee was then (as now) operating under a L.t?'11A--.....~-
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)~~rri.? ~ 
issued by the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources under 
authority of the FWPCA. The permit imposed obligations con-
siderably more lenient than those ordered by the DC. With 
respect to storm overflows, it required only that they be 
"correct[ed]n or "control[led] ," rather than eliminated. And 
four of the permit's effluent limitations (suspended solids, 
biological oxygen demand, fecal coliform, and free chlorine), 
which tracked those contained in Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) regulations, were less stringent than those imposed by the 
DC. The one exception was the phosphorus ~imitation, as to which 
the DC, the permit, and EPA coincided. 
CLJ , addressing only the federal common law issues, 
'= --...... ...__,_ ---
affirmed in part and reversed in part. It held that the DC had 
statutory and constitutional jurisdiction over the action and 
that venue was proper. It found that the FWPCA and the Clean 
Water Act of 1977 did not preempt federal common law of nuisance, 






relief. Therefore Milwaukee's compliance with its NPDES 
permit did not necessarily insulate it from suit or from 
the relief ordered, CA 7 found the cor~ d of ':,~ 
proof to be preponderance of the evidence, rather than clear ~ 
and convincing evidence, although it noted that its holding 
would be the s ame in any case. Turning to the evidence, which 
it summarized in the published opinion and analyzed at greater 
length in a supplemental unpublished order, Petn. App. B-1, 
CA 7 upheld the DC's findings that Milwaukee had caused the 
injuries complained of in Illinois and Michigan. With respect 
to relief, CA 7 upheld the DC' s order that overflows be elim-
inated and that phosphorus effluents be limited to the level 
prescribed by EPA and the NPDES permit. However, CA 7 reversed 
on the other effluent limitations insofar as they exceeded the 
levels set by EPA and the NPDES permit. 
3. CONTENTIONS: 
I. No. 79-408 
(a) Milwaukee says this case presents the issue 
explicitly left open in Illinois v. Milwaukee, namely whether 
new federal laws and regulations have now Ero tanto preempted 
the federal common law of nuisance. At least, says Milwaukee, 
compliance with a permit should be a defense to a federal 
common law a.ct ion. At the time of the Illinois v. Milwaukee 
decision, the primary federal law on the subject was the pre-1972 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, which attempted to set water 






enacted the FWPCA, which required all point sources of 
water pollution to obtain permits specifying effluent 
limitations. Congress further refined this comprehensive 
statutory scheme in the Clean Water Act of 1977. 
Milwaukee argues that no room remains for federal 
common law in light of§ 402 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342k, 
which establishes that compliance with a permit is deemed 
compliance with the Act. CA 7's decision undercuts the 
finality of the permits, and thereby frustrates congressional 
intent, by permitting federal law challenges to activity per-
missible under a permit. 
Milwaukee also cites§ 505(e) of the Act, 33 U.SoC. 
§ 1365(e), which provides: 
nothing in this section shall restrict 
any right which any person (or class 
of persons) may have under any statute 
or common law to seek enforcement of 
any effluent standard or limitation or 
seek any other relief (including relief 
against the Administrator or a State 
agency). 
Section 402k provides that compliance with a permit is compliance 
with§ 505. Hence federal common law, even assuming it survives, 
cannot provide a cause of action for activity in compliance with 
an NPDES permito 
Milwaukee cites Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 565 
(1963), in which the Court declined to apportion an interstate 
stream in accordance with judicially-developed principles because 






be allocated. Perhaps more to the point, Milwaukee cites 
Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage 
System v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006 (CA 4 1976) (.§!! bane). This 
was a federal common law nuisance action seeking to enjoin 
discharges by a city sewer system operating under an NPDES 
permito CA 4 found no federal common law right because the 
dispute was purely intra-state. But it made the following 
observation: 
Indeed, it would be an anomoly 
to hold that there was a body of 
federal common law which proscribes 
conduct which the [FWPCA] legiti-
mates. The defendants are in com-
pliance with the statute. They are 
operating under a permit issued in 
accordance with the statute and the 
authorization of the Environmental 
Protection Agency. The Congress and 
the Executive Department, acting 
through the Environmental Protection 
Agency, have declared their conduct 
lawful until the time for the appli-
cation of more restrictive standards. 
While the state courts are free to 
apply state nuisance law more rigidly, 
a federal court in such a local con-
troversy may not turn to a supposed 
body of federal common law to impose 
stricter standards than the statute 
provides. · 
539 F.2d, at 1009 (footnote omitted). 
. 
Illinois and Michigan respond that the FWPCA does 
not preempt federal common law of nuisanceo They cite§ 510 
of the Act, 33 U.S.Co § 1370, which expressly allows states 
and. political subdivisions to impose effluent limitations more 
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according to Michigan, is§ 5ll(a), 33 U.S.C. § 137l(a), 
providing that nothing in the Act is to be construed as 
"limiting the authority of any officer or agency of the 
United States under any other law or regulation not in-
consistent with [the] Act •.• o" CA 7 found this provision 
arguably broad enough to allow federal courts to remedy com-
mon law nuisances. 
Michigan and Illinois also rely on§ 505(e), supra. 
In their view, this section is clearly intended to leave open 
all rights and remedies under other bodies of law, including 
federal common law. Illinois would counter Milwaukee's§ 505 
argument as follows: this provision as a whole gives citizens 
a right to sue, but only to enforce limitations contained in 
the Act, and therefore compliance with an NPDES permit is a 
valid defe.nse to a§ 505 suit under§ 402k; § 505(e), however, 
doesn't provide a common law cause of action, but merely retains 
existing actions, and therefore permit compliance is not a de-
fense to a common law suit. 
(b) Second, Milwaukee argues that CA 7's decision 
requiring elimination. of all sewage overflows is unsupported by 
the evidence. Milwaukee cites two decisions for the proposition 
that the trial court should have applied a "clear and convincing" 
test, not the "preponderance" test endorsed by CA 7. North Dakota 
v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923); New York v. New Jersey, 256 
U.S. 296 (1921). In the present case, there is no evidence that 
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or Michigan. And neither Illinois nor Michigan requires 
as much of their own municipal treatment facilities -- a 
factor the Court found persuasive in denying relief in 
Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 522 (1906). 
Michigan c.nd Illinois respond that CA 7 upheld the 
DC on overflow elimination after exhaustively analyzing the 
evidence, and contend that the Court shouldn't substitute its 
judgment on factual findings. Michigan argues that the "clear 
and convincing" standard applies only when the defendant is a 
state; the "preponderance" standard endorsed by CA 7 is proper 
when the defendant is not a state. Georgi~ v. Tennessee Copper, 
206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
(c) Milwaukee contends that it was not subject to 
the DC's jurisdiction under the Illinois Long-Arm Statute, which 
authorizes service upon persons committing a tortious act within 
Illinois. Discharging sewage in Wisconsin, which subsequently 
causes damage in Illinois, is not committing a tortious act in 
Illinois. Even if there was statutory competence, jurisdiction 
in the due process sense was lacking because Milwaukee has not 
purposefully availed ·itself of the privilege of conducting ac-
tivities in Illinois. Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
Finally, venue was improperly laid in Illinois, because the claim 
did not "ar[i]se" there within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 139l(b). 
Illinois responds that the Illinois Long-Arm Statute 
extends to acts done in other states resulting in injury in 
Illinois, Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 






minimum contacts by virtue of its sending pollution into 
Illinois,~ Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 
493, 500 (1971). Venue was proper under§ 139l(b) because 
under federal common law, as well as traditional tort 
principles, the claim "arises" where the injury occurs. 
II. No. 79-571 
(a) Illinois cross-petitions from CA 7's 
judgment insofar as it reversed the DC on the question of 
effluent limitations and required a remedy no more stringent 
than the limitations in Milwaukee's NPDES permit. (Michigan 
doesn't join the cross-petition because it is interested only 
in the DC's phosphorus limitation, which was affirmed by CA 7.) 
Illinois asserts that on these questions CA 7 failed to exer-
cise the deference to the DC' s findings required by the "clearly 
erroneous" standard. It should have affirmed; but even if it 
had legitimate evidentiary questions, the proper remedy was to 
remand rather than to resolve those questions at the appellate 
level. 
Milwaukee responds that the questi~n raised here is 
purely one of fact and does not merit the Court's review. 
(b) Illinois asserts that CA 7 erred in determining 
not to consider its state common law and statutory claims. As 
noted previously,§ 510 states that it does not deprive states of 
their power to enforce stricter limitations under their own law. 
See also§ 505(e), quoted supra. And Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals 
Corp., supra, said in dictum that interstate nuisance suits could 







Milwaukee responds that federal common law, not 
state law, controls interstate nuisance suits of this type. 
Illinois v. Milwaukee, supra, 406 U.S. 91, 102 (1972); Texas 
v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 241-242 (CA 10 1971). 
(c) Illinois claims, finally, that CA 7 erred 
in looking exclusively to secondary treatment requirements 
for publicly-owned treatment works under FWPCA § 30l(b)(l)(B), 
because the Act also permits more stringent •~ater quality re-
lated effluent limitations." 
4. DISCUSSION: 
I. No. 79-408 
(a) The question of whether federal common law 
~ ., 
of nuisance is pro tanto preempted, or at least strictly limited, - -
by the FWPCA is, I believe, potentially certworthy. The Court 
left that issue open in Illinois v. Milwaukee; and Congress sub-
sequently passed the FWPCA, a statute both more comprehensive and 
more specific than its predecessor. The question is one of im-
portance to the administration of federal law because of the many 
bodies of water bordering on two or more states. There is as yet 
no direct conflict in · the Circuits, but dicta in the Jones Falls 
case incline the other way. Still, the issue is bound to arise 
again and the Court may wish to await a split in the Circuits. 
It is true that Congress clearly didn't intend, in 
the FWPCA, to preempt state or federal laws stricter than the Act. 
It can't be argued, therefore, that uniformity in enforcement was 







have envisioned with pleasure the prospect of an inexpert 
federal court, guided by nothing more substantial than the 
inexact principles of common law nuisance and the hoary 
maxims of equity jurisprudence, imposing environmental duties 
stricter than those adopted through democratic processes and 
developed by supposedly expert federal and state agencies. I 
recommend that the Court call for the SG's views on this question. 
(The United States submitted an amicus brief on CA 7 taking no 
position on the merits but supporting the argument that federal 
common law of nuisance is not preempted or limited by the FWPCA.) 
(b) The authorities conflict as to whether the proper 
standard of proof is "clear and convincing" or "preponderance." 
It could be argued that none of these cases is really relevant 
since all were decided by this Court in its original jurisdiction. 
It might be worthwhile to resolve this issue if the Court should 
grant cert and affirm on the preemption question. However, CA 7 
) said that it would reach the same result on either standard. A 
brief review of the record raises doubts as to whether the DC's 
opinion could really be supported under a "clear and convincing" 
standard, but the Court may not want to get involved with this 
type of factual analysis. 
(c) The Long-Arm and venue points are insubstantial. 
It could be argued that there is more to the due process claim 
in light of recent decisions retrenching on state court personal 
jurisdiction. The language in Hanson v. Denkla about "purpose-








pollution context; and Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp. 
indicated that jurisdiction is proper. 




' The sufficiency of the evidence does not 
CA 7 seems correct, bas~ on pr,,ior cases, 
-
that state law does not apply to this type of case. In any 
event, it could be argued that state and federal law are to 
be construed in pari materia and therefore CA 7's conclusions 
about the reach of federal law apply as well to the state 
causes of action. 
(c) CA 7's decision to make the federal common 
law standards congruent with the FWPCA's secondary treatment 
limitations seems reasonable and does not independently merit 
review. 
/ 
In sum, I would CFR the SG; if cert is granted, I would 
r 
limit it to the question of whether the federal common law 
nuisance action is preempted or otherwise limited by the FWPCA 
and the Clean Water Act. 
✓L--,,~e~r~e~a~r~e=-----=r:::.esponses in Nos. 79-408 and 79-571, and 
three amicus briefs. -Illinois has objected to Mid-America 
Legal Foundation's motion to file an amicus brief on the ground 
that Mid-America's founder and present director represented 
Milwaukee as one of its counsel in the DC below. Mid-America has 
not disclosed such a connection in its brief. ~. 
11/9/79 
ME 
Miller Ops. in Petn. App. 
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I"\_ A~- ,I~ To : The Chief Justice 
~ ~r- Mr. Justice Brennan 
l'~tlC_,IJ.._ ~ "'4 •~A- ~ ~ t ice Stewart 
.J!I _ _ ~ _ ~ L J~~ ~ ___ .; Mr. Justice Mar · 11 
~ ~,...,._~~-, Clf,rM', 
~~t ~~-{~c..- ~~~.,.,.~ 
- ' SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Mr. 
~ )//~ • 14 · 1[ 7 / ·" ~ ~ /4 Jt1("1ff..'Mr. Justice White 
?T¥-OF M LLWAUK~ ET AL. ~ ATES OF ILLI~OIS.., ~ 
...-Y ~~ ~ ~ D ~ GAN Circulated: ~-..:/-~ 
~ N CERTIORARI 'l' O THE UNITED sRQ.rrisrculated : _____ _ 
C0UR'r OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIHCUIT 
Ko. 79-408. Decided :Vlarch - , 1980 
MR. JuSTlCE Vi1H1TE, dissenting. 
This case presents the question of whether a federal com-
1 f i( • " • h - f h . mon a.w o nmsance survives t e enactment o compre ens1ve 
federal statutes aimed at restoring and maintaining the 
chemical, physical. and biological integrity of the Nation's 
waters. I believe this question to be- an important one, and 
dissen t from the denial of the petit ion for certiorari. 
The genesis of this case was a motion by Illinois to file a bill 
of complaint under our original jurisdiction and asl.fing that 
we abate as a public nuisance the ·discharge of sewage into 
Lake M ichigan by the city of Milwaukee ano associated cities 
and sewerage corrmiiss10ns (hereafter individually or jointly 
Milwaukee). We declined to exercise jurisdiction over the 
case and remitted the parties to Federal District-Court. Illi-
nois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 9,1 ( 1972). We found that 
the District Court would have jurisdiction to entertain the 
~ ~ 
case as one founded on a federal common law of nuisance, and 
held that that bocly of law was not pre-emptea by the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act then in effect, 62 Stat. 1155, as 
amended, 33 U. S. C. § 115:t et seq. (1970 ed.). However, we 
specifically noted that 
"[i] t may happen that new federal laws and new federal 
regulations may in time pre-empt the field of federal 
common lavv of nuisance. But until that comes to pass, 
federal courts will be empowered to appraise the equities 
of the suits alleging creation of a public nuisance by 
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2 MILWAUKEE v. ILLINOIS AND MICHIGAN 
Shortly after our decision in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 
Congress drastically altered the federal approach to water 
pollution by passing ttie"ii'edefirr Water Polfut ion Control Act 
A1~ ents of 1972, 86 Stat. 816, 33 U. . C. § 1251 et seq. 
( 1972 Amendments), which have been referred to as a "com-
prehensive programmatic and regulatory creation," W. Rodg-
ers, Environmental Law 361 (1977). In place of existing law, 
which had attempted with mixed success to control water pol-
lution by setting ambient water quality standards for receiv-
ing water, Congress adopted a scheme aimed largely at achiev-
ing strict, technology-based effluent limitations on point 
so urces of pclfotion. The 1972 A.mendments provide for 
enforcement by means of National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) permits, which serve "to 
transform generally applicable effluent limitations ... into 
the obligations (including a timetable of compliance) of the 
individual discharger .. . ," EPA v. State Water Resources 
Control Board, 426 U. S. 200, 205 ( 1976). Generally speak-
ing, a discharger who complies with its NPDES permit is 
deemed to be in compliance with those sections of the law 
on which the conditions in the permit are based. Ibid. Pur-· 
suant to the 1972 Amendments, Milwaukee obtained NPDES 
permits governing the operation of its sewer system. It is 
now operating under the terms of those permits as modified 
in part by a subsequent state-court judgment. 
In the meantime Illinois-joined lY MichiE;an as an inter-
venor-had refiled""its--;uit in the Distnct Court for the North-
ern District of Illinois. In July 1977, the District Court held, 
inter alia, that Milwaukee's sewage discharges constitu d a 
federal common-law nmsance.- e cour ordered ilwau-
k~d effluent lim1tations and mandated 
the virtual· elimination of combined ·sewer overflows by 1989. 
Both of these requirements were considerably more stringent 
than the obligations imposed on Milwaukee by the terms of 
its NPDES permit. 
On appeal , the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 























MILWAUKEE v. ILLINOIS AND MICHIGAN 3 
Act of 1977, 91 Stat. 1566, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq. (1976 
ed., Supp. I) pre-empts the federal common law of nuisance, 
provides a defense to a nuisance suit, or strictly limits the relief 
available in a nuisance suit to the minimum standards pre-
scribed by the federal statutes. 599 F. 2d 151, 157-164. 
Therefore, Milwaukee's compliance with its NPDES permits 
didnot necessaril "insulate7tTrom smt or from the relief 
or ered. The Court i note, however, that effluent limita-
ti~under the federal stat~tes imposed an "appropriate 
starting point'· for analysis under the federal common law. 
Id., at 164. "'ith respect to relief, the Court of Appeals 
reversed f;lie District Court's imposition of effluent limjt,atlons 
more stringent tliari'"the 7eve1s prescrioed by E:e A ~nd the 
NPDES permi~ ect the DTsrrict -C-ourt's ~rement 
t~nbine<l se~r overflows be sitbstltntialTY e!l"minated by 
1989. --Milwaukee petitions this Court in No. 79-408 to review, 
inter alia, the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the federal 
common law of nuisance survives the 1972 Amendments and 
the Clean Water Act of 1977, and iti; affirmance of the Dis-
trict Court 's order requiring limitations on combined sewer 
overflows more stringent than those contained in the NPDES 
permit. In No. 79- 571, Illinois cross-petitions for review, 
inter alia, of the Court of Appeals ' conclusion that the District 
Court should have imposed effluent limitations no more 
stringent than those promulgated by EPA and contained in 
the permit. 
I would ~1t the petition in No. 79-408 limited to the 
question of whether the 1972 Amendments and the Clean 
Water Act of 1977 pre-empt, proyide a defonse to, or strictly 
limit the relief available under, the federal common law of 
nuisance. While I do not necessarily disagree with the deci-, 
sion below, I do believe that there is substantial doubt as to 
whether Congress intended that inexpert fede?il courts, 
guided by principles of common-law nuisance and maxims of 
equity jurisprudence, could impose environmental duties 



















4 MILWAUKEE v. ILLINOIS AND MICHIGAN 
developed by supposedly expert federal and state agencies. 
There are many interstate bodies of water that could become 
the subject of federal common-law nuisance actions. In my 
view, the issue presented by this case-which subsumes the 
question w""e left unaecia=ect m lllinois v. City of Milwaukee, 
supra-is sufficiently important to justify a grant of certiorari. r 
- ~npum:t <!fltltrl of tlft ~b j6mftg 'Jf rur 1pnghm. J;}. ~ 2llffeJ!..;l 
CHAMBERS OF 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE March 5, 1980 
Re: No. 79-408 - Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan 
Dear Lewis, 
If the other votes are firm, your vote would grant this 
case. 
I agree that the companion case, no. 79-571, should also 
be considered. That case presents two general questions. 
First is the claim by Illinois that the Court of Appeals erred 
in reversing the District Court's imposition of certain efflu-
ent limitations more stringent than those contained in the 
permit. The Court of Appeals found that although neither the 
Act nor the permit limited a federal court's power to require 
compliance with more stringent limitations under the federal 
common law, those standards did provide "guidelines" which 
the court should not ignore. Looking in part to the standards 
contained in the Act and the permit, the Court of Appeals 
found itself "unable to conclude, after a careful examination 
of the evidence cited by the plaintiffs to justify [certain 
of] the limitations imposed, that this evidence was sufficient." 
Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court 
insofar as it had imposed certain effluent limitations more 
stringent than those contained in the discharge permits. 
If in no. 79-408 we decide that the federal common law 
of nuisance does not survive the 1972 and 1977 amendments, 
the Court of Appeals is correct in no. 79-571, although for 
the wrong reason. If the federal common law of nuisance 
still has life, there remains the question whether the Court 
of Appeals correctly assessed the evidence as well as the 
question to what extent the statutory limitations should 
guide the District Court in arriving at a remedy. 






The second question in no. 79-571 is whether the Court 
of Appeals was correct in not addressing Illinois' state 
common law and statutory contentions. The Court of Appeals 
held that it is the federal common law that controls, not 
state statutes or common law, relying on Illinois v. Mil-
waukee in 406 U.S. I had thought Illinois v. Milwaukeehad 
settled that federal law controls, absent Congressional in-
dications to the contrary. 
I would probably hold, rather than grant, no. 79-571. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
Sincerely yours, 
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THE CH IEF JUSTICE 
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March 13, 1980 
RE: 79-408 - Milwaukee v. Illinois 
Dear Byron: 
I will vote to note in this case and hold 
No. 79-571 . 
Mr. Justice White 
(5 
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TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul Cane 
DATE: November 29, 1980 
RE: No. 79-408, Milwaukee v. Illinois 
Question Presented 
The questions are (1) whether the recent amendments 
to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act preempt the federal 
common law of nuisance and, if not, (2) whether the lower 
courts correctly applied the common law of nuisance in 





- - 2. 
Background 
I regret that this is a "bobtail" memorandum on a 
very complex case. I hope that even this will be useful. Jf ~ 
The first troublesome point for me was understanding 
r 
the pollution technology that Milwa~kee uses and that which the 
district court ' ordered Milwaukee to use. The problem, to state 
it quite simply, is the effect of rainstorms on "combined" 
.,___..._ --- ----------- --
sewers--those in which both storm runoff and sewage are --
transmitted in the same system. In such systems, the sewer 
normally contains only sewage. When a rainstorm occurs, storm 
~ I ------ -t I 
water mixes with the 'sewage and the water level rises. Old-
style sewer technology pe:~ftted the combination of sewage and 
storm water to overflow when the water level rose. More modern 
systems, such as that now used in Milwaukee, are called 
"controlled" sewer systems. 
F 
capacity is not expanded. 
In these systems, the total sewer 
Instead, when a storm hi ts, the 
system is designed to contain the "first flush" of storm water 
I 
until the sewage already in the system can be sent on its way 
' ) 
to the treatment plant. Under the new syst~ms, therefore, 
overflows that do occur consist mostly of harmless storm water 
I 
r 
runoff. The "controlled" systems catch about 90 per cent of 
the sewage that formerly was permitted to overflow. (In 
Milwaukee, the overflow that does occur spills into Lake 
Michigan.) 
The district court was not satisfied with this 
relatively inexpensive system. The district court insisted 
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sufficiently large to absorb--without overflow--the rainfall 
associated with the largest storm in the city's history. This 
!
, "elimination of sewage" approach apparently costs a great deal 
more than the "control of sewage" approach Milwaukee used. 
The district court imposed this remedy under the ------
federal common law of nuisance. In Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 
U.S. 91 (1972), the Court [wisely!] declined to entertain this 
controversy under its original jurisdiction, and sent the 
parties to district court to litigate under the federal common 
. . 
law of nuis~nce. The Court noted, however, that "new federal 
) 
laws and new federal regulations may in time preempt the field 
of federal common law of nuisance." Id. at 107. 
amendments 




water pollution laws do indeed preempt 
nuisance law~ If not, the case also presents the question 
,\ 
whether the lower courts correctly applied nuisance law. 
Discussion 
A. Petr's Arguments 
1. Milwaukee contends that federal statutory law 
since Illinois v. Milwaukee has indeed preempted the federal 
common law of nuisance. Five months after that case, Congress 
enacted the Federal Water Pollution Coritrol Act Amendments of 
1972, which drastically changed federal statutory law. Under 
the new law, "point sources" of pollution, such as sewers, must 
obtain permits. The permit system is designed to require 
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Milwaukee has a permit for its sewer system. The permit system 
is highly relevant to the preemption inquiry, because the 
system reflects Congress' intention to provide a (1) uniform, 
(2) final, and (3) enforceable pollution control scheme. Those 
goals would be furthered by finding that the statute preempts 
federal common law. Uniformity is the result of expert work by 
the EPA identifying hazards. Finality is desirable because of 
the massive investment in pollution control equipment 
necessary. Cities and businesses ought to be able to rely on 
the determination that their technology is adequate. Section 
402(k) of the Act makes clear that compliance with a permit 
shall in almost all cases be a defense against a claim of 
violating the Act. The system's enforcement mechanism is 
effective because all persons are permitted to participate in 
the permit-granting process. Illinois, for example, could 
participate to claim at the outset that Milwaukee's pollution 
was harming Lake Michigan. 
In light of this complex mechanism, federal courts 
should not be able to second-guess, on a case-by-case bas is, 
the technology investments that are in place as a result of 
reliance on a permit. 
2. Even if federal common law of nuisance remains, 
the district court misapplied it in this case. The court below 
(1) issued its decision in the absence of evidence of actual 
harm to Illinois, and 
of the cost to build 
fatal deficiencies. 
(2) did not consider proffered evidence 
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First, there was no evidence of actual harm. 
Illinois presented no studies showing that sewage effluents are 
sufficiently diluted by Lake Michigan as to eliminate any harm. 
Fecal coliform counts on Illinois beaches fail to demonstrate 
any pollution corning from Milwaukee. There is no evidence of 
any water-related diseases in Illinois. There is no evidence 
of harm to fish life. There is no evidence that any specific 
algae, taste, or odor problem is attributable to Milwaukee 
sewage. In sum, it is impossible to measure any effect on the 
lake caused by Milwaukee's discharges. The district court 
based its decision on disputed theoretical testimony of 
experts. But if there were any merit to their theories, surely 
there would be some ernpir ical evidence to back them up. But 
there is none. 
Second, the district court 
evidence on the costs of the program 
incorrectly rejected 
that it imposed. A 
nuisance is unreasonable harm to another. Cost obviously is 
relevant to the reasonableness of the harm. It is significant 
that Illinois itself does not require the kind of sewage 
treatment that it sought to impose on Milwaukee in this 
lawsuit. Illinois does not do so because it knows that the 
system required by the district court is not cost-effective. 
3. Milwaukee also contends that venue and 
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B. Resps' Arguments 
Illinois argues that federal common law of nuisance 
still exists, and that the district court correctly applied it 
in this case. 
1. The language of the Act demonstrates that 
Congress intended to preserve, not abolish, the federal common 
law. Various sections make clear that state and federal 
authorities may impose regulations more strict than those 
contained in the Clean Water Act. The Senate Report 
accompanying the 1972 Amendments states that "compliance with 
requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a common 
law action for pollution damages." Legislative debates and 
hearings are in accord. The EPA, which is primarily 
responsible for enforcing the Act, has long viewed the federal 
common law as an essential complement to the Act. That is so 
because the effluent limitations imposed by EPA are only a 
national minimum level of pollution control. Moreoever, 
Congress has explicitly recognized that the Act and EPA's 
regulations fail adequately to address the problem of combined 
sewer overflows such as those in Milwaukee. EPA's regulations 
do not even address the problem of fecal coliforms and 
phosphorous that gives rise to this lawsuit. 
2. The district court correctly applied the federal 
common law. Wisconsin, which issues permits in EPA's stead, 
imposes woefully inadequate pollution control requirements. No 




- - 7. 
court properly refused to balance costs against benefits 




Venue, and jurisdiction under the Illinois "long 
properly existed in the Northern District of 
c. Analysis and Criticism 
1. The preemption issue seems to reduce itself to 
this question: does the 




occur when a source is 
complying with a permit, or does the statute only set a minimum 
level of pollution control that can be challenged as a nuisance 
on a case by case bas is? As I understand the Act, Congress 
intended that the permit would be a defense to certain kinds of 
actions under the Act, but not necessarily a defense to a 
common law nuisance action. Congress was aware of this Court's 
prior decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee. Had it wished to 
preempt the common law remedy established in that case, it 
could have done so explicitly. The portions of the Act, and 
legislative history, cited by Milwaukee sound to me as if they 
were taken out of context. Milwaukee is unable to cite any 
specific statement in the Act or legislative history that 
flatly states that receipt of a permit constitutes an 
authorization to permit pollution. That seems to be such a 
critical question that I would have expected industry advocates 
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2. Based on the short amount of study that I have 
given this case, I have a fairly strong initial view that the 
district court incorrectly applied the federal common law of 
nuisance in this case. First, Illinois in effect concedes that 
no empirical evidence of harm was demonstrated. The district 
court acted only on the basis of conflicting theoretical 
opinions by experts. Second, the district court thought cost 
was irrelevant to a nuisance inquiry. I always had thought 
that cost was highly relevant in determining whether a 
particular harm was "unreasonable." Clearly, Congress if it 
chose could insist by statute that certain technology be used 
to avoid even theoretical possibilities of harm. But the 
technology requirements imposed by the district court are not 
mandated by statute. If common law nuisance survives at all, I 
think any court-imposed remedy ought to be based at least on 
concrete evidence of harm. Based on my relatively brief study, 
there is no such evidence in this case. It is significant, I 
think, that the SG--although strongly supporting Illinois' 
position on the preemption question--takes no position on the 
application of common law nuisance principles in this case. 
3. Although I did not study the matter, I doubt that 
there is any merit to Milwaukee's jurisdiction and venue 
arguments. 
Summary 
This is a complicated case, and my views are based on 
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think that the federal statute does not preempt nuisance law. Z------------
I tend to think that C~ngress has set minimum reguirements, not 
an absolute standard. 
I think, however, that the courts below may have 
misapplied common law nuisance on the facts of this case. The 
courts have placed a significant burden on Milwaukee without 
any showing of actual harm. Congress, if it chose, could do 
this by statute, but I tend to think that a court, in a common 
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DATE: December 4, 1980 Ji.,. , ~ V 9--Le__ .> '2-0o u.,,5 ¢4 ~ 
No. 79-408, Milwaukee v. Illinois ~~~ 
~~ ~ 
RE: 
'i7Z I t::!'/f 7 ~~ ~ ~ J/S ~ f-
4-u:r ~ ~ ~av-{,,~~/ , 
n , This morning you asked three questions. First, do 
? ~ ~ ~ ~ i,.,tJ ~ . 
prior Supreme Court cases support my argument that measurable 
harm is a prerequisite to the finding of a nuisance? Second, 
does a nuisance exist where the cost of remedying pollution 
outweighs harm? Third, is Milwaukee complying with its NPDES 
I 
C-/11 ~ 
- - 2. 
permit? I address questions I and II in this memo. The third 
I think I should talk to you about. 
I 
I recommend that you read New York v. New Jersey, 256 
U.S. 296 (1921). Look with particular care at pp. 309-314. In 
that case, the Court considered pollution of New York Harbor. 
The Court addressed the the burden of proof to be carried in a 
~ - - -·-----
nuisance suit, particularly where the defendant was a State. 
It noted: 
~,. ~A~¢,. 
[T]he burden upon the State of New York of 
sustaining the allegations of its bill is 
much greater than that imposed upon a 
complainant in an ordinary suit between 
private parties. Before this court can be 
moved to exercise its extraordinary power 
under the Constitution to control the 
conduct of one State at the suit of 
another, the threatened invasion of rights 
must be of serious magnitude and it must be 
"--" 
U..i<\.£'e.,._, 
establ1she y clear and convincing 
evidence. __ .. -----Two points emerge from this discussion. First, I 
th i nk that a plaintiff suing a public entity under the federal 
common law of nuisance must make a greater showing of harm than 
is necessary against a private defendant. Obviously, Congress 
if it chose eol!W.~ by statute could i mpose burdens on states and 
cities based on legislative findings of necessity. But a 
federal court in a common law suit should be careful that the 
harm is demonstrable before it burdens a state or local 
government. The CA7, in its opinion, dismisses the preceding 
quotation. It contends that the high proof requirements are 
applicable only to cases arising under the Court's original 
• - - 3. 
jurisdiction. No doubt it is true that proof must be clear 
when the Supreme Court acts as a fact find er. But I think 
considerations of federalism require that proof be similarly 
-~- -- -·- · - -- --= -- --  ------------......... _......_ ____ ~ 
convincing in any common law nuisance suit against a state or --
local government. 
Second, the preceding quotation introduces a section 
of the opinion in which the Court insists on proof of actual 
harm. The Court commented: 
JJl.}1.v ~-f· 
~ 
The evidence introduced . . . is much too 
meager and indefinite to be seriously 
considered as ground for an injunction .. 
. It is much to be regretted that any 
forecast as to what the effect would be of 
the treatment and deeply submerged 
discharge through multiple outlets proposed 







almost entirely upon the conflicting 
opinions of expert witnesses, for 
experience with such treatment and 
dispersion under even approximately like 
conditions seems entirely wanting. 
* * * * 
[W] e must conclude that the complainants 
have failed to show by the convincing 
evidence wnic t e law requires that the 
sewase which the defendants intend to 
discharge into Upper New York Bay . 
would so corrupt the wat~ r of the Bay as to 
create a p uisance By causTng 
offensive o r o u ,ightly deposits on 
the surface or that it would seriously add 
to the pollution of it. ~ ~~/-
~ s I read the case, it supports the view that the harm must be 
~ concrete and demons~rable, not speculative. Indeed, at the end 
of the opinion the Court noted that, "if the proposed sewer in 
operation shall prove sufficiently injurious to the waters of 
the Bay," the Court would entertain a new application for an 
injunction based on that demonstrable harm. 
• - - 4. 
New York v. New Jersey is not the only relevant case. 
The Court did not enter an injunction even in Missouri v. 
Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906). In that case, plaintiffs had 
shown that "germs of infectious diseases are shown to pass from 
Chicago to St. Louis." And "the waters of the Mississippi are 
shown to be more heavily burdened with disease organisms and 
infectious material since the opening of the canal." 
Moreoever, the "typhoid mortality at St. Louis, on account of 
defendants' action, has increased annually 77. 7 per cent for 
the period of four years since the establishment of the" canal. 
But even these findings of actual harm were not deemed 
sufficient. The Court noted, "Our conclusion upon the present 
evidence is that the case proved falls so far below the 
allegations of the bill that it is not brought within the 
principles" of nuisance. 
Compare the definiteness of these findings with those 
in the instant case. The Court of Appeals, for example, 
summarized the evidence by noting that "a swimmer can be 
infected"; "[d] rinking water can be contaminated"; "viruses 
and bacteria can 
drinking water"; 
survive"; "pathogens . . . may infect 
"if viruses or bacteria contaminate the 
drinking water supplies, Illinois residents ingesting the water 
can of course become infected." 
The opinion, it seems to me, 
possibilities, but devoid of actualities. 
is replete with 
Every sentence is, 
in sum, "harm can occur." I find no sentence that describes 
some injury that does occur. Based on my limited study, at 
• - - 5. 
this point I tend to think that this falls short of the 
convincing proof of actual injury that ought to be required 
under a common law nuisance suit against a public entity. 
II 
I was not persuaded by the CA' s refusal to balance 
costs against benefits. The CA relied on two factors. It 
said, first, that "the balance is of less importance when the 
plaintiff is a sovereign state." Second, "if the pollution 
endangers the public health, injunctive relief is proper 
without resort to any balancing." 
In my view, each of these propositions falls in light 
of the analysis in part I of this memo. To repeat, I think it 
is highly relevant that the defendant is a public entity. 
Federal courts should be careful before imposing on local 
entities a common law remedy that Congress has not itself 
imposed. The CA' s second statement is subject to the same 
objection I entered supra: there has been no finding of actual 
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JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN , J R . 
• .§u:pum.t QJourl of firt 'Jfuti:uh .§btlt.9' 
~rur!rhtgfo-n. J . QJ. 20ffeJ!., 
December 5, 1980 
RE: No. 79-408 City of Mil waukee v. Illinois 
Dear Chief: 
Bill Rehnquist has agreed to do the opinion for the 
Court in the above. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
f /) • • 
, l' 
)
·7 , L , 
•,7'v 
- -
MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul Cane 
DATE: January 16, 1981 
RE: 79-408, Milwaukee v. Illinois 
Justice Rehnquist in this opinion takes a 
different point of view from our own -- indeed, different 
from my understanding of the wishes of the Conference -- in 
holding that the 1972 amendments preempted the federal 
common law. 
When the case was heard, we tentatively 
shared the view that, although the federal common law 
remains, CA7 had misapplied that law on the facts of this 
case. If this is still your position, we may have to write. 
~H 
P.W.C. 1/16/81 
i1 ~ -1;4_ Id.Ir/./?,. ~ 
~~ i.1 N-ld. i;; 
~ a-,~,~«....-1 ~J <j _u_f 
'f lo ~ 
~ ~ -~~ 
~ {Ps '¥ W'j/.5 ~~ 
$--,-,,~  I . . "L 1 tP 1 /z2-
- -;§u.pi-ttnt C!tllttrl cf tqt 1tnfuh ~tltlts 
'Jl1 a.g !rmghtn. ~. <lt• 2llffe '! .;l 
CHAM5ERS OF 
THE cH1EF JusT1cE February 4, 1981 
RE: 79-408 - City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan 
Dear Bill: 
I still find 
await a dissent. 
since I am reall 
Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
11 and will stand by and 





JUSTICE BYRO N R . WHITE 
----
-
,§qrmtt QJourl of t~e 'Janili~ ,§Wts 
1fraslfi:n-gton. tf) . (q. 2Db,J!2 
-
February 5, 1981 
I 
Re: 79 -4 08 - City of Milwa ukee v. 
. States of Illinois and Michigan 
Dear Bill , 
Please join me . 
Sincerely yours, 
M~ 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
Re: No. 79-408 - Milwaukee v. Illinois 
Dear Bill: 
/ 
February 13, 1981 
I have spoken to John. 
this case in due course. 
I shall undertake a dissent in 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
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MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Justice Powell /-i~gr~ 
FROM: Paul Cane 
DATE: February 17, 1981 
RE: 79-408, Milwaukee v. Illinois 
I agree that WHR has written a fine opinion. 
It is significant that BRW, who knows a lot about this case, 
has joined. Yet, I am uncertain. I am not as familiar with 
this case as I would like to be, but we definitely shared 
the view after argument that there was no preemption. I 
recall two specific problems. First, the 1972 amendments 
were enacted only five months after this Court's decision in 
...., ___. - - -- -~ -
Illinois v. Milwaukee. One would think that Congress, if it 
intended to extinguish the common law remedy, would have 
specifically provided to do that. I should think that 
industry representatives would have sought just such a 
provision. Second, Congress specifically enacted a "savings 
clause,"§ 505(e}, that provides: 
th ' ({ h. ' ' ' h 11 . t No 1ng 1n t 1s sections a restr1c any 
right whic"fi any person (or class of 
persons} may have under any statute or 
common law to seek enforcement of any 
effluent standard or limitation or to seek 




WHR relies on the words "in this section" to dismiss ~• 
relevance of the savings clause. I am doubtful. My j~sion 





nationwide minimum standards for pollution. I don't think ---Congress envisioned compliance with the Act as an authorization 
to pollute to that extent. 
HAB is writing a dissent along these lines. I agree 
that it is important to have a Court opinion; yet I am 
hesitant to commit to a position before we have heard the 
opposing views of someone who has studied the matter more 
extensively than we have. What would you think about 
circulating your proposed memo, modified as follows? 
Dear Bill: 
I voted with you at Conference to 
reverse, although my reasons were somewhat 
different from your preemption theory. 
You have written a fine opinion and 
now have four votes. I may join you to 
assure a Court opinion. Before doing so, 
however, I think I should await Harry's 
dissent. 
As you recall, this is the approach you took in the computer-




jWla:$1fingbtn. J. QJ. 20.;rJ-1~ 
C HAM BERS OF 
.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR. ~~ 
February 17 , 1981 
79-408 Milwaukee v. Illinois 
Dear Bill: 
I voted with you at Conference to reverse , 
although my reasons were somewhat different from your 
preemption theory . 
You have written a persuasive op1n1on and now have 
four votes . I am glad to join you to assure a Court 
opinion. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
.- ~ '- - - ttA-, 
lfp/ss 3/23/81 
MEMO TO FILE 
79-408 Milwaukee v. Illinois 
Over the weekend, I took a more careful look at 
WHR's opinion circulated nearly two months ago (January 27), 
as I think I owe him some sort of response. 
At Conference I expressed the view that there was 
no preemption, but would vote to reverse because CA7 applied 
the incorrect standard of proof. As I was quite persuaded 
as to the standard of proof error, I may not have focused on 
the preemption issue as carefully as I should. 
As Paul Cane noted in his memo of February 17, WHR 
has written a persuasive opinion. I mention briefly 
principal points he makes in part III with respect to 
preemption. 
The legislative history, reviewed by WHR)is 
convincing that Congress intended a "complete rewriting" of 
water pollution legislation. Senator Randolph, Chairman of 
the appropriate Senate Committee, stated that "It is perhaps 
the most comprehensive legislation ever developed in this 
field". It followed within a matter of a few months of our 
1972 decision that Congress certainly had in mind. As Paul 
has suggested, the failure to preempt federal common law 
expressly cuts somewhat against WHR's position. On the 
other hand, the clear intent to legislate comprehensively 
I 
- - \ . 
- -
2. 
with respect to water pollution regulation, suggests that if 
indeed Congress had wanted to allow federal courts to impose 
additional pollution requirements, Congress would have said 
so in language more explicit than §SOS(e). Policy 
considerations, not emphasized specifically by WHR, are 
persuasive with me. This case is illustrative. Here EPA 
promulgated regulations specifying effluent limitations, and 
Milwaukee was operating its sewer systems under duly 
authorized permits issued by the state agency. If the city 
complieJ,with the EPA approved water pollution regulations) 
it does not make much sense for a federal court to impose 
different and more stringent standards under an ill-defined 
common law of nuisance. If the federal common law was not 
preempted, it should have been - especially since federal 
common law normally is judicially created only when Congress 
has not acted in an area implicating important federal 
interests. 
This still leaves the ambiguous language of 
§505(e) that says: "Nothing in this section shall restrict 
any right which any person may have under any statute or 
common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or 
limitation " WHR says that this is merely a citizen 
suit provision, similar - if not identical in language to 
citizen suit provisions in several other environmental 
statutes. It does not mean that the act as a whole is 
subject to any stricter standards that a federal court may 
- - 3. 
conclude the common law should provide. By its language, 
§505's authorization of suits by individuals is limited by 
the phrase "in this section". 
In sum, although I will await HAB's dissent, I now 
have a better understanding of the preemption issue and 
probably will join WHR. 
6-.t~r.· 
ss 
,> • -~ - -
lfp/ss 3/23/81 
MEMO TO FILE 
79-408 Milwaukee v. Illinois 
Over the weekend, I took a more careful look at 
WHR's opinion circulated nearly two months ago (January 27), 
as I think I owe him some sort of response. 
At Conference I expressed the view that there was 
no preemption, but would vote to reverse because CA7 applied 
the incorrect standard of proof. As I was quite persuaded 
as to the standard of proof error, I may not have focused on 
the preemption issue as carefully as I should. 
As Paul Cane noted in his memo of February 17, WHR 
has written a persuasive opinion. I mention briefly 
principal points he makes in part III with respect to 
preemption. 
The legislative history, reviewed by WHR is 
convincing that Congress intended a "complete rewriting" of 
water pollution legislation. Senator Randolph, Chairman of 
the appropriate Senate Committee, stated that "It is perhaps 
the most comprehensive legislation ever developed in this 
field". It followed within a matter of a few months of our 
1972 decision that Congress certainly had in mind. As Paul 
has suggested, the failure to preempt federal common law 
expressly cuts somewhat against WHR's position. On the 
other hand, the clear intent to legislate comprehensively 
- -
2. 
with respect to water pollution regulation, suggests that if 
indeed Congress had wanted to allow federal courts to impose 
additional pollution requirements, Congress would have said 
so in language more explicit than §505(e). Policy 
considerations, not emphasized specifically by WHR, are 
persuasive with me. This case is illustrative. Here EPA 
promulgated regulations specifying effluent limitations, and 
Milwaukee was operating its sewer systems under duly 
authorized permits issued by the state agency. If the city 
complies with the EPA approved water pollution regulations 
it does not make much sense for a federal court to impose 
different and more stringent standards under an ill-defined 
common law of nuisance. If the federal common law was not 
preempted, it should have been - especially since federal 
common law normally is judicially created only when Congress 
has not acted in an area implicating important federal 
interests. 
This still leaves the ambiguous language of 
§505(e) that says: "Nothing in this section shall restrict 
any right which any person may have under any statute or 
common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or 
limitation ••• " WHR says that this is merely a citizen 
suit provision, similar - if not identical in language to 
citizen suit provisions in several other environmental 
statutes. It does not mean that the act as a whole is 
subject to any stricter standards that a federal court may 
l'f' 0 - -
conclude the common law should provide. By its language, 
§505's authorization of suits by individuals is limited by 
the phrase "in this section". 
3. 
In sum, although I will await HAB's dissent, I now 
have a better understanding of the preemption issue and 




March 23, 1981 
No. 79-408 Milwaukee v. Illinois 
Dear Bill: 
Over the weekend I reviewed files in which I have 
not stated my position on circulated opinions, and find that 
I "owe" you some response. 
As I voted with you at Conference to reverse, I 
will at least join your judgment. I was convinced, as you 
may recall, that CA7 applied an incorrect standard of proof 
in evaluating the common law nuisance claim. 
You have written a persuasive opinion and now have 
four votes. I may well join you to assure a Court opinion. 
I will, however, await Harry's dissent on the preemption 
issue. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
LFP/ss 
1) ~~J , l"~ to 
..,_.J,g{tt r 
oL..,.,t . '_,),,....1 c . 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED S'!i~ES'uiat ed : ---=---
~ ~ Id~ u_ l>f _ • - LJ.. No. 79-408 
v 1? ~~~' 
City of Milwaukee et al., 
Petitioners, 
v. 
States of Illinois and 
Michigan. 
I a_. ~ u-, ~ 
,4)~-~ ,~ 
On Writ of Certiorari to the -- / {:, 
United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit, 
[April -, 1981] 
JusTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting. 
Nine years ago, in Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91 
(1972), this Court unanimously determined that Illinois 
could bring a federal common-law action against the city of 
Milwaukee, three other Wisconsin cities, and two sewerage 
commissions. At that time, Illinois alleged that the discharge 
of raw and untreated sewage by these Wisconsin entities 
into Lake Michigan created a public nuisance for the citizens 
of Illinois. The Court remitted the parties to an appropriate 
federal district court, "whose powers are adequate to resolve 
the issues." Id., at 108. 
Illinois promptly initiated the present litigation/ and 
pursued it through more than three years of pretrial dis-
covery, a six-month trial that entailed hundreds of exhibits 
and scores of witnesses, extensive factual findings by the Dis-
trict Court, App. F to Pet. for Cert., and an exhaustive re-
view of the evidence by the Court of Appeals. 599 F. 2d 
151, 167-177 (CA7 1979). Today the Court decides that this 
nine-year judicial exercise has been just a meaningless cha-
rade, cf. Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, 409 U. S. 
363, 389, 390 (1972) (dissenting opinion) , inasmuch as, it 
1 This Court's decision was issued April 24, 1972. The complaint was 
filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of 





MILWAUKEE v. ILLINOIS 
says, the federal common-law remedy approved in Illinois v. 
Milwaukee was implicitly extinguished by Congress just six 
months after the 1972 decision. Because I believe that Con-
gres• intended no such extinct-ion, and surely did not con-
template the result reached by the Court today, I respect-
fully dissent. · 
I 
The Court's analysis of federal common-law displacement 
rests, I am convinced, on a faulty assumption. In contrast-
ing congres!2ional displacement of the common law with fed-
eral pre-emption of state law,2 the Court assum~s that as 
soon as Congress "addresses a question previously governed" 
by federaI common law, "the need for such an unusual exer-
cise of lawmaking by federal courts disappears." Ante. at 7. 
This "automatic displacement" approach is insdeq··ate in 
two respects. It fails to reflect the unique role federal com~ 
mon-law plays in resolvin disputes of an inkrstate nature. 
In addition, it ignores this Court's frequent recognition that 
2 I have no quarrel with the Court's distinction between the issues of 
federalism at stake in assessing congressiona.l preemption of state law and 
the separation of powers concerns that are implicated here. But there 
i, more to this distinction than the Court suggests. In decid'ng whether 
federal law pre-empts state law, the Court must be sensitive to the 
potential frustrat ion of national purposes if the States are p~rmittPd to 
control condurt that is the subject of federal regulation. San Diego 
Bui!ding Trad:s Couwil v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236. 244 (19.'i,9). See 
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc v. Paul. 373 U. S. 132, 142 (1963) . 
For this reason, in pre-emption analysis the role of federal law is often 
detr rmined on an "all or nothirg" basis. On the other hand, where · 
federal interests alone are at stake, participation by the federal courts is 
oft.en desirable, and indeed necessa ry, if federal policies developed by 
C0ngre.~s are to be fullv effectuated. See, e. g., Miree v. DeKalb County, 
433 U. S. 25. 35 ( 1977) ( opinion concurri11g in the judgment) : United 
States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U. S. 580, 592-593 (1973). 
The whole concept of interstitial federal lawmaking suggests a coopera-
tive interaction between courts and Congress that is less attainable where· 
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federal common law may complement congressional action in 
the fulfillment of federal policies. 
It is well-settled that a body of federal common law h_as 
survived the decision in Erie R . Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 
64 0938T. Erie made clear that federal courts, as courts of 
limited jurisdiction, lack general power to formulate and im-
pose their own rules of decision. Id., at 78. The Court, 
however, did not there upset, nor has it since disturbed. a 
deeply rooted, more specialized federal common law that has 
arisen to effectuate ±eaeraI mterests embodied either in the 
Constitution or an Act of Congress. 3 Chief among the fed- , 
eral interests served by this common law are the resolution 
of interstate disputes and the implementation of national 
~ -
st~licies. · 
Both before and after Erie, the Court has fashioned fed-
eral law where the interstate nature of a controversy renders 
inappropriate the law of either State. See, e. g., Nebraska 
v. Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589 (1945); Hinderlider v. La Plata 
Co. , 304 U. S. 92, 110 (1938); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 
46, 95, 97-98 (1907) (apportioning waters of interstate 
stream) . See also Cissna v. Tennessee, 246 U. S. 289, 296 
(1918); Howard v. Ingersoll, 13 How. 381 (1851) (resolving 
interstate boundary conflict). When such interstate dis-
putes arise, it is clear under our federal system that laws of 
one State cannot impose upon the sovereign rights and inter-
ests of another. The Constitution, by Art. III, § 2, explic-
itly extends the judicial PQwer of the United Stafos to inter-
state controversies, and ilifscourt, in - equitably resolving 
such d1sp~s, has developed a body of "what may not im-
3 See generally Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: 
Constitutional Preemption, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1024, 1026-1042: (1967) ; 
Friendly, I n Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 
N. Y. U. L. Rev. 383, 405--422 (1964) . See also Leypold, Federal Com-
mon Law: Judicially Established Effluent Standards as a Remedy in 
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properly be called interstate common law." Kansas v. Colo• 
rado, 206 U. S., at 98. 
Lon before the 1972 decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee, 
federal common law enunicated by this Court assured each 
State the right to be free from unreasonable interference 
with its natural environment and resources when the inter• 
ference stems from another State or its citizen eorgia v. 
Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230, (1907); Mis• 
souri v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496, 520, 526 (1906). See New 
Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931); New York 
v. New Jersey, 256 U. S. 296 (1921). The right to such 
federal protection is a consequence of each State's entry into 
the Union and its commitment to the Constitution. In the 
words of Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court: 
"When the States by their union made the forcible 
abatement of outside nuisances impossible to each, they 
did not thereby agree to submit to whatevermight be 
done. They did not renounce the possibility of making 
reasonable demands on the ground of their sti11 remain• 
ing quasi-soverign interests; and the a1temative to force 
is a suit in this court;" Georgia v. Tennessee Copper 
Co., 206 U. S., at 237. 
This Court also has applied federal common law where 
federally created substantive rights and obliga.tions are at 
stake. Thus, the Court has been called upon to pronounce 
common law that will fill the interstices of a pervasively fed-
eral framework, or avoid subjecting relevant federal interests 
to the inconsistencies in the laws everal States. Textile 
Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 53 U. S. 448, 456-457 (1957); 
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947); 
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S. 363, 366-367 
(1943); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 
315 U. S. 447 (1942) . If the federal interest is sufficiently 
strong, federal common law may be drawn upon in settling 
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vides no precise answer to the question posed. See, e. g., 
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S., at 458; Clearfield 
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U. S., at 368-370. See gen-
erally United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 
U. S. 580, 593 (1973) ("the inevitable incompleteness pre-
sented by all legislation means that interstitial federal law-
making is a basic responsibility of the federal courts."). 
Each of these sources of federal common law was recog-
nized in Yllinois v. Milwaukee. The Court there concluded 
that the common law of interstate nuisance supplied the 
requisite federal question jurisdiction to bring an action in 
District Court. In so deciding, the Court reasoned that it 
was appropriate for federal courts to fashion federal commori 
law "when there is an overriding federal interest in the need 
for a uniform rule of decis1on or where the controversy 
touches basic interests of federalism." 406 U. S., at 105, 
n. 6. The Court relied heavily upon interstate air pollution 
and water allocation cases where the complaining party was 
e State invoking the Court's original jurisdiction. Id., at 
104--106. In addition, it recounted the hist-0ry of federal in-
terstate water quality legislation and suggested that the abid-
ing federal interest in the purity of interstate waters justified 
application of federal common law. Id., at 101-103. Sig-
nificantly, the Court found no barrier to federal common law 
despite the number of federal statutes and. regulations that 
already provides remedies to abate pollution in inters~ate 
waters. 406 U. S., at 103. 
Thus, quite contrary to the statements and intimations 
of the Court today; ante, at· 16, 18, 19, n. 17, Illinois . v. 
Milwaukee did not create the federal common law of nuis-
~ 
~-~ 
ance. Well before this Court and Congress acted in 1972, r v 
there was ample recognition of and foundation of'""a federal ~ 
common law of nuisance applicable to Illinois' situation.4 
4 This Court had not previously indicated that the federal common law 
of nuisance provided a basis for federal question jurisdiction under 28 





MILWAUKEE v. ILLINOIS 
Congress cannot be presumed to have been unaware of the 
relevant common-law history, any more than it can be 
deemed to have been oblivious to the decision in Illinois v. 
Milwaukee, announced six months prior to the passage of 
tho Federal Water Pollution Control Act amendments of 
1972 (Act or Amendments), 86 Stat. 816. · The central ques-
tion is whether, given its presumed awareness, Congress, · in 
passing these amendments, intended to prevent recourse to 
the federal common law of nuisance. 
The answer to this question, it seems to me, requires a 
m<2re thorougQ_ exploration of __Q_ongressional intent than is 
offered by the Court. Congress had "spoken to" the partic-
ular problem of interstate water pollution as far ba.ck as 
1888,5 a.nd in 1948 ·did so in a broad and systematic fashion 
with the enactment of the Water Pollution Control Act. 0 
In Illinois v. Milwaukee, the Court properly regarded such 
expressions of congressional interest as not an obstacle but 
an incentive to application of the federal common law. 406 
U. S., at 102-103. · -The fact that Congress in 1972 once 
again addressed the complicated and difficult problem of 
purifying our Nation's waters should not be taken as pre-
sumptive evidence, let alone conclusive proof, that Congress 
meant to foreclose pre-existing approaches to controlling 
interstate water pollution.7 Where the possible extinction 
~ ~ee Act of June 29, 1888, 25 Stat. 209. See· also Rivers and Harbors 
Act of 1899, 30 Stat. 1121. 
6 Pub. L. 80--845, 62 Stat. 1155 ( 1948). 
7 The Court at this point, ante, at 8-9, would rely on Arizona v. Calif or-
nia, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), and Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 
618 (1978). But those cases do not stand for the broad proposition 
announced today. In Arizona v. California, Congress had developed a 
formula for apportioning the limited waters of the Colorado River and 
directed the federal agency to implement the formula. In the face of 
this express congressional allocation, the Court declined to substitute its 
own notioPs of an equitable apporti:mment. 373 U. S., at 565. In 
Mobil . Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, the Court confronted a statute that 
- -
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of federal common law is at issue, a reviewing court is obli-
gated to look not only to the magnitude of the legislative 
action but also with some care to the evidence of specific 
congressional intent.8 
II 
In my view, the language and structure of the Clean Water 
Act leave no doubt that Congress intended to preserve the 
federal common law of nuisance. Section 505 (e) of the 
Act reads: 
"Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which 
any person ( or class of persons) may have under any 
h \', \ 
statute or common law to seek enforcement of any efflu-
ent standara or limitation or to seek any other relief 
(including relief against the Administrator or a State 
agency)." 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (e) (emphasis added). 
had created a precise federal remedy where before there had been none. 
Since federal law, when the statute was passed, did not address wrongful 
death on the high seas, and the statute itself expressed no intent to pre-
serve or create federal remedies, the Court acceded to the particularized 
judgment of Congress. 436 U. S., at 625. Unlike the statutes at issue in 
those two cases, the 1972 Act addressed a broad and complex subject to 
which state and federa.l law had previously spoken, and in doing so recog-
nized and encouraged many different approaches to controlling water pol-
lution. See discussion in Part II, infra. 
s Inevitably, a federal court must acknowledge the tension between its 
obligation to apply the federal common law in implementing an important 
federal interest, and its need to exercise judicial self-rest raint and defer 
to the will of Congress. Congress, of course, may resolve this tension by 
making it known that flexible and creative judicial response on a case-by-
case basis must yield to an interest in certainty under a comprehensive 
legislative scheme. At the same time, the fact that Congress can properly 
check the courts' exercise of federal common law does not mean that it 
has done so in a specific case. This Court is no more free to disregard 
expressions of legisla.tive desire to preserve federal common law than it 
is to overlook congressional intent to curtail it. Indeed, the Court has 
admonished that statutes will not be construed in dercgation of the 
common law unless such an intent is clear. lsbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 
343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952) (citing cases). 
- -
il~ 
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The Act specifically ~n" to include States. and 
thus embraces respondents Illinois and Michigan. § 502 (5); 
33 U. S. C. § 1362 ( 5). It preserves their right to bring an 
action against the governmental entities who are charged 
with enforcin the statute. Most important, as succinctly 
stated by the Court Appeals in this case: "There is noth-
ing in the phrase 'any statute or common law' that suggests 
that this pro"ision is limited to state common law." 599 F. 
2d 151, 163 (CA7 1979). To the best of my knowledge, 
every federal court that has considered the issue has con-
cluded that, in enacting § 505 (e), Congress meant to pre-
serve federal as well as state common law.9 
Other sections of the Clean Water Act also support the 
conclusion that Congress in 1972 had no intention of ex-
t inguishing the federal common law of nuisance. Although 
the Act established &. detailed and comprehensive regulatory 
system aimed at elin'.:nating the discharge of pollutants into 
all navigable waters_, it did not purport to impose a unitary 
9 E. g., National, Sea Clammers Assn. v. City of N ew York, 616 F. 2d 
1222, 1233 n. 31 (CA3 1980), cert. granted, - U. S. - (1980): Cali-
fornia Tahoe R egional Planning .Agency v. Jennings, 594 F. 2d 181, 193 
(CA9), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 864 (1979). See abo Illinois v. Outboarcl 
Marine Corp. , 619 F. 2d 623. 626 (CA7 H,80), cert. pending, No. 80-126; 
United States v. Atlantic-Richfield Co ., 478 F . Supp. 1215, 1218-1220 
(Mont. 1979); United States ex rel. Scott v. United States Steel Corp., 
356 F. Supp. 556, 559 (ND Ill. 1973); United States v. Ira S. Bushey & 
Sons, Inc , 346 F . Supp. 145, 149 (Vt. 1972), aff'd, 487 F. 2d 1393 (CA2 
1973), cert. denied , 417 U.S. 976 (1974). 
The Ccurt relies on Committee for the Considemtion of the Jones Falls 
Sewage System v. Train, 539 F. 2d 1006, 1009, n. 9 (CA4 1976), in criti-
cizing the "unlikely assumption" that § 505 (e) preserved anything other 
than "the more routine state law." Ante, at 21. Jones Fal,ls offers no 
support for this criticism, since it concerned only intrastate pollution of 
navigable waters. Indeed, the court there assumed the continued appli-
cability of federal common law where a. State sought to vindi<'a.te its 
rights in an interstate controversy, id., at 1010, but conrlud: d that be-
cause the controversy was entirely local, the st~.te common law of nuisance· 





MILWAUKEE v. ILLINOIS 9 
enforcement structure for abating water pollution. In par-
ticular, Congress expressly provided that the effluent limita-
tions promulgated under the Act do not preclude any State 
from establishing more stringent limitations. § 510; 33 
U. S. C. § 1370. It also made clear that federal officer~ or 
agencies are not foreclosed from adopting or enforcing stricter 
pollution controls and standards than those required by the 
Act. § 511 (a); 33 U. S. C. § 1371 (a). 
Thus, under the statutory scheme, any permit issued by 
the EPA or a qualifying state agency does not insulate a dis-
charger from liability under other federal or state law.10 To 
the contrary, the permit granted pursuant to § 402 (k), 33 
U. S. C. § 1242 (k), confers assurances with respect to cer-
tain specified sections of the Act, but the requirements under 
other provisions as well as separate legal obliga.tions remain 
unaffected. See generally EPA v. State Water Resources 
Control Board, 426 U. S. 200, 205 (1976). Congress plainly 
anticipated that dischargers might be required to meet stand-
ards more stringent than the minimum effluent levels ap-
proved by the EPA. Those more stringent standards would 
necessarily be established by other statutes or by common 
law. Because the Act contemplates a shared authority be-
tween the Federal Government and the individual States, see, 
e. g., § 101 (b); 33 U. S. C. § 1251 (b) , it is entirely under-
standable that Congress thought it neither imperative nor 
desirable to insist upon an exclusive approach to the im-
provement of water quality.11 
The Court offers three responses to this view of congres-
sional intent. With regard to the language of § 505 (e), it 
iQ Cf. New Jersey v. City of New York , 283 U. S. 473, 477, 482-483 
(1931) (compliance with permit requirements of federal statute does not 
bar injunctive relief in federal nuisance action). 
11 It is significant that elsewhere in the statute, Congress expressly mani-
fested an intention to foreclose the applicability of other laws. See § 312 
(f) (1); 33 U. S. C. § 1322 (f) (1). Congress thus demonstrated that it 
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attributes critical significance to the words "this section," 
and concludes that Congress meant only to assure that the 
citizen suit provision did not extinguish formerly available 
federal common-law actions. Ante, at 20-21. The Court 
thus reads § 505 ( e) as though Congress had said that " 'this 
section' does not take away any pre-existing remedies, but 
the remainder of the statute does." This is an extremely 
strained reading of the statutory language,12 and one that is 
at odds with the manifest intent of Congress to permit more 
stringent remedies under both federal and state law. See 
§§ 510, 511; 33 U. S. C. §§ 1370, 1371. If § 505 (e) is to be 
construed as the Court suggests, then it authorizes the abro-
gation of all pre-exi:;;ting rights, both statutory and common 
law, in the area of water pollution control. The Court's con-
struction therefore, would render suspect, if not meaningless, 
the Act's other provisions. Rather than interpreting § 505 
( e) as a license to supplant all legal remedies outside the 
· Act itself, I would construe the reference to "this section" as 
simply preventing pre-existing rights of action from being 
subjected to the procedural and jurisdictional limitations im-
posed by § 505 on persons who would sue under the Act. 
The Court also relies on certain language contained in the 
legislative history of the 1972 amendments Ante, at 10-12. 
Based on the remarks of several of the Act's proponents that 
this was the most comprehensive water pollution bill pre-
pared to date, the Court finds a strong congressional sugges-
tion that there is no room for improvement through the fed-
eral common law. But there is nothing talismanic about 
such generalized referenc~. The iact that legislators may 
characterize the"ir7fforts as more "comprehensive" than prior 
legislation harqly prevents them from authorizing the con-
tinued existence of supplemental legal and equitable solu-
tions to the broad and serious problem addressed. Moreover, 
12 The Court points to no other judicial decision that has construed the· 
language 'Of § 505 (e) in thls fashion. See n. 9, supra. 
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the Court ignores express statements of legislative intent 
that contradict its position. The Senate Report accompany-
ing the 1972 legislation explicitly describes the congressional 
intent informing § 505 (e): 
"It should be noted, however, that the section would 
specifically preserve any rights or remedies under !!1Y 
other law. Thus, if damages could be shown, other rem-
edies would remain ~availa'6Ie. Compliance with require-
ments under this Act would not be a defense to a com-
mon law action for Rollution damages." S. Rep. No. 
92-414, p. 81 (1971), reprinted in 2 A Legislative His-
tory of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments 
of 1972, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 1499 (Comm. Print 1973) 
( Legis. Hist.) .13 
This deliberate preservation of all remedies previously 
available at common law makes no distinction between the 
common law of individual States and federal common law. 
Indeed, the legislative debates indicate that Congress was 
specifically aware of the presence of federal common law, 
and intended that it would survive passage of the 1972 
amendments. In one particularly revealing colloquy on the 
Senate floor, Senator Griffin noted the pendency of a suit 
challenging the dumping of iron ore pollutants into Lake 
Superior. 1 Legis. Hist. 191. See Reserve Mining Co. v. 
EPA, 514 F. 2d 492 (CA8 1975) (en bane) . The Senator 
inquired whether the suit, which was based in part on the 
federal common law of nuisance,14 would be affected by pas-
sage of the 1972 amendments. Senators Muskie 15 and Hart 
13 See also H. R. Rep. No. 92-911, pp. 132, 134 (1972), reprinted in I 
Legis. Hist. 819, 821. 
14 1 Legis. Hist. 191. See R eserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F. 2d, at 
501. 
1 5 The Court previously has observed that Senator Muskie was perhaps 
the Act's primary author, and has credited his views accordingly. See 
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U. S. 112, 129 (1977); 
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each responded that the new legislation would not affect or 
hinder "the suit now pending against the Reserve Mining 
Co. under the Refuse Act of 1899 ... [,] the existing Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act or other law." 1 Legis. 
Hist. 211 (Sen. Hart.) ( emphasis added) .16 
Finally, the Court attaches significance to the fact that the 
1972 amendments provided a more rigorous administrative 
mechanism for addressing interstate controversies. Ante, at 
18-19. The Court evidently regards the provision of a new 
administrative abatement process as a type of jurisdictional 
requirement, for it criticizes Illinois' failure to invoke the 
mechanism before seeking any form of judicial relief. Id., at 
19. Even if this were the case, the new notice and hearing 
procedure became available only two years after Illinois com-
menced this action. There is no suggestion that Illinois 
failed to pursue administrative abatement under the then 
applicable federal statute. Indeed, it is undisputed that 
Illinois made prolonged and diligent efforts to secure admin-
istrative relief .11 Nonetheless, the Court in effect concludes 
that it is not enough to exhaust administrative remedies that 
16 See 1 Legis. Hist. 191-194. See also id., at 248 (colloquy between 
Reps. Dingell and Wright); id , at, 252 (Rep. Dingell). Although all 
pa rties to the Senate colloquy over the R eserve Mining litigation recog-
nized that federal common law was one of tbe counts at stake, Senator 
Griffin's chief concern was over the possible retroactive effect of § 402 (k} 
on li tigation already commenced. Senators Muskie and Hart, as well as 
the EPA, took the position that {here would be no disruption of the pend-
ing action, which had been commenced in February 1972, three months 
prior to this action. In his letter to Senator Griffin, the EPA General 
Counsel added a caveat that has obvious significance here: 
"[I]t is reasonable to conclude that the courts will not interpret any 
legislation to deprive them of jurisdiction of pending litigation in the ab-
sence of clear and explicit language. There is no such clear and explicit 
language to this effect in the pending bill." I Legis. Hist. 193. 
17 Brief for respondent Illinois 8-9 (describing unsucce::;sful pursuit of 
administrative remedies); see 599 F . 2d, at 158 (describing administrative· 
processes under statute before 1972) . 
- -
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existed at the time a common-law action was initiated; a 
complainant must also be prepared to pursue new and wholly 
unforeseen administrative avenues even as it seeks a final 
judgment in federal court. I am aware of no case that adopts 
so harsh an approach to the pursuit of administrative rem-
-edies, and I see no basis for imposing such a requirement 
in this con text. 
Moreover, contrary to what the Court implies, Congress 
never intended that failure to participate in the § 402 ad-
ministrative process would serve as a jurisdictional bar. 
Nothing in the language of § 402 suggests that a neighboring 
State's participation in the permit-granting process is any-
thing other than voluntary and optional.18 Indeed, the Con-
ference Committee considering the 1977 amendments to the 
Act was presented with a proposal that would have made 
such participation a jurisdictional prerequisite.19 This pro-
18 As the Court observes, the scheme established by § 402 "provides a 
forum for the pursuit" of a neighboring State's claim that the controls to 
be imposed are not sufficiently stringent. Ante, at 19 (emphasis added). 
There is nothing inconsistent about making this forum available, and 
encouraging its use, while at the same time permitting the pursuit of other 
remedies. If there are problems with the efficiency of such an approach, 
Congress of course is free to modify the statutory scheme. 
19 Following the District Court's ruling in this case, Congressman Aspin 
of Wisconsin proposed· an amendment to § 402: 
"Sec. (a) Section 402 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act is 
amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection: 
"'(1) In any case where a States whose waters may be affected by the 
issuance of a permit under this section fails to submit any recommenda-
tions to the permitting State as authorized in subsection (b) ( 5) of this 
section, the State failing to make ::mch a submission (and its persons) 
shall not have any standing to bring any action to abate (in whole or in 
part) as a nuisance under common law in any court of the United States 
any discharge which would have been the subject- of such recommendations.' · 
"(b) The amendment made by subsection (a) of this section shall be 
applicable to any action brought to abate (in whole or in part) as a 
11uisance under common law in any court of the United States .any dis-
( 
- - ~,~ 
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posal was not adopted by the Conference Committee, and 
among its opponents was the Department of Justice. In a 
letter sent to all conferees, the Department made clear its 
understanding that, absent such an amendment. the federal 
common law would continue to be relied upon in the national 
effort to control water pollution.20 
The Justice Department's position on the survival of fed-
eral common law is consistent with the stance taken by the 
EPA both in this litigation and throughout the period since 
the 1972 amendments were enacted. The EPA in fa.ct has 
relied upon the federal common law of nuisance in addition 
to the remedies available under the statute in seeking to 
charge of pollutants, unless a final decision has be:m rendered prior to 
the effective date of this amendment." App. to Brief for Illinois 98. 
The proposal was made after both Houses had debated and passed the 
1977 amendments to the Act but before the Conference Committee had 
met. In his testimony before a House committee considering the pendirig 
bill, Congressman Aspin voiced concern over the recent district court 
decision, and suggested that Congress "explicitly express its belief t hat fed-
eral common law has been pre-empted." Hearings before the House· 
Committee on Public Works and Transportation on H. R. 3199, 95th Con-
Cong., 1st Sess., 3~8 (1977). 
20 Letter to Senator Muskie from James Moorman, Asst. Atty. Gen., 
Land and Natural Resource Division, Oct. 18, 1977: 
"The common law serves to give an injured party who may have been 
neglected by the statute or by an overburdened enforcing agency a form 
of redress. There 1s no good argument for removing this opportunity for 
remedy. The basic principle of the common law of public nuisance is that 
one is liable for damages caused to another where the benefit of one's ac-
tion does not outweigh the harm. This is a sound principle. Where it 
can be shown that pollution has injured someone it should not be a 
sufficient defense to claim that the generalized standards of a statute have 
been complied with. Polluters should properly be held to a standard that 
holds them liable for unnecessarily injuring others and not :;imply for 
violating the statutory law. The number of cases under the common law 
will inevitably be small but where they are meritorious there is no basis 
for abolishing this cause of action." (Emphasis added.) App. to Brief_' 
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protect water quality.21 As the agency charged with enforc-
ing and implementing the Act, EP A's interpretation of the 
scope and limits of that statute is entitled to considerable 
deference. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16 (1965). 
Where, as here, the agency has publicly and consistently 
acted upon its interpretation, congressional silence is not 
without significance, particularly since this area has been a 
subject of frequent and intense ·legislative attention. And 
where, as here, the agency's continued reliance on federal 
common law is firrrily grounded in the language and structure 
of the statute, I fail to see how the Court can so lightly dis-
regard its interpretation. 
III 
Assuming that Congress did preserve a federal common 
law of nuisance, and that respondents properly stated federal 
common-law claims for relief, there remains the question 
whether the particular common law applied here was reason-
able. Because of its ruling, the Court does not explicitly 
address this question. Nonetheless, in its detailed review of 
respondents' claims, the Court in effect concludes that the 
federal common law applied by the ·District Court and the 
Court of Appeals was defective. In particular, the Court 
asserts that federal courts may not exceed the statutory mini-
mum approach sanctioned by Congress, see ante, at 15-16, 
and may not use federal power to impose a State's more 
stringent pollution limitation standards upon out-of-state 
polluters. See ante, at 20. In contrast, I believe the courts 
below acted correctly in both respects. 
As the Court of Appeals properly recognized, 599 F. 2d, at 
21 See, e. g., Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., supra; Unit ed States 
v. Hooker Chemicals k Plastic Corp., (WDNY No. 79-990, filed Dec. 20, 
1979). Several courts have held that the United States can state a claim 
for relief under the federal common law of nuisance. See, e. g., Unitea 
States -v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., supra; United States v. Solven~ 
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164, the determination by Congress to preserve rights of 
action at federal common law did not grant federal courts 
the freedom to disregard the statutory and regulatory struc-
ture approved by Congress. We noted in Illinois v. Milwau-
kee that "the various federal environmental protection stat-
utes will not necessarily mark the outer bounds of the federal 
common law, [but] they may provide useful guidelines in 
fashioning such rules of decision." 406 U. S., at 103, n. 5. 
These guidelines, however, bear primarily on the problems 
of proof faced by the parties; they do not determine the ex-
clusive source of the law to be applied. 
In this instance, problems of proof arise under a familiar 
form of common-law action. A public nuisance involves un-
reasonable interference with a riglit common to the general 
public.22 Drawing on the Cour"t"S dects10n 1rr(J-eorrjia v. 1'en-
neswe Cower Co., 206 U. S. 230, 238-239 (1907), the Court 
of Appeals concluded that ni-asance is established at federal 
common law only if "the defendant is carrying on an activity 
that is causing an injury or significant threat of •injury to 
some cognizable interest of the complainant." 599 F. 2d, at 
165. Whether a particular interference qualifies as unrea-
sonable, whether the injury is sufficiently substantial to war-
rant injunctive relief, and what form that relief should take 
are questions to be decided on the basis of particular facts 
and circumstances.23 The judgments at times are difficult, 
but they do not require courts to perform functions beyond 
their traditional capacities or experience.2 1 
22 Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 821B (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970). 
See generally W. Pros::;er, The Law of Torts 583-591 ( 4th ed. 1!}71) ; W .. 
Rodgers, Environmental Law 102-107 (1!}77). 
23 See Restatement (Second) of Torts, at § 821B; Prosser, at 602-606; 
Note, Federal Common Law in Interstate Water Pollution Disputes, 1973 
U. Ill . Law Forum 141, 154-158. 
24 See, e. g., R eserve Mining Co . v. EPA, 514 F . 2d 492, 506-540 (CAB 
1975) (en bane); United States v. Armco Steel Corp ., 333 F. Supp. 1073, 
1079-1084 (SD Tex. 1971) ; Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 455, 
- -
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When choosing the precise legal principles to apply, com-
mon-law courts draw upon relevant standards of conduct 
available in their communities. Where federal common law 
is concerned, "th[is] choice-of-law task is a federal task for 
federal courts." United States v. Little Lake Misere Land] 
Co., 412 U. S., at 592. At the same time, while federal law 
controls a particular question or problem, state law IDl!Jc fur-
nish an a ro riate measure of the content of this federal 
law. See, e. g., oard o Comm rs v. nite States, 308 U. S. 
343, 349-352 (1939). See also Textile Workers v. Lincoln 
Mills, 353 U. S. 448, 457 (1957); Clearfield Trust Co. v. 
United States, 318 U. S. 363, 367 (1943). What the Court 
today characterizes as the inappropriate application of more 
stringent standards from Illinois state law in fact reflects a 
federal common-law court's proper exercise of choice-of-law 
discretion.~5 
The Act sets forth certain effluent limitations. As did the 
5~~ 
~ ~ 
Court of Appeals,2° a court applying federal common law in~ 
Pa. 392, 319 A. 2d 871 (1974); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N. Y. 
2d 219, 257 N. E. 2d 870 (1970); People ex rel. Stream Control Comm'n 
City of Port Huron, 305 Mich. 153, 9 N. W. 2d 41 (1943); Board of 
Comm'rs v. Elm Grove Mining Co., 122 W. Va. 442, 9 S. E. 2d 813 
(1940); Fink v. Board of Trustees, 71 Ill. App. 2d 276, 218 N. E. 2d 240 
(1966); City of Murphysboro v. Sanitary Water Board, 10 Ill. App. 2d 
111, 134 N. E. 2d 522 (1956). Thus, there can be no merit to the 
Court's suggestion, ante, at 17-18, that the technical difficulty of the 
subject matter renders inappropriate any recourse to the common law. 
The complexity of a properly presented federal question is hardly a suita-
ble basis for denying federal courts the power to adjudicate. Indeed, the 
expert agency charged with administering the Act has not hesitated to 
invoke this common-law jurisdiction where appropriate. 
n Moreover, that the District Court may have abused its discretion is 
no basis for concluding that state law standards are irrelevant to the 
federal common law. 
26 599 F. 2d, at 167-168. See also unpublished order of the Court of 
Appeals, App. to Pet. for Cert. B-2 to B--4; unpublished findings of fact 
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a given instance may well decline to impose effluent limita-
tions more stringent than those required by Congress, because 
the complainant has failed to show that stricter standards 
will abate the nuisance or appreciably diminish the threat 
of injury. But it is_ a far different proposition to pronounce, 
as does the Court today, that federal courts "lack authority 
to impose more stringent effluent limitations under federal 
common law than those imposed" under the statutory 
scheme. Ante, at 13 ( emphasis added). --- The authority of 
the federal courts in this area was firmly established by the 
decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee. In delineating the legiti-
mate scope of the federal common law, the Court there ex-
pressly noted the relevance of state standards, adding that 
1'a State with high water-quality standards may well ask 
that its strict standards be honored and that it not be com-
pelled to lower itself to the more degrading standards of a 
neighbor." (Emphasis added.) 406 U. S., at 107. The Act 
attributes comparable respect to the stricter effluent limita-
tion levels imposed by individual States. § 510, 33 U. S. C. 
§ 1370. Since -both the Court and Congress folly expected 
that neighboring States might differ in their approaches to 
the regulation of the discharge of pollutants into their navi-
gable waters, it is odd, to say the least, that federal courts 
should now be deprived of the common-law power to effect 
a reconciliation of these differences. 
The problem of controlling overflows is particularly ame-
nable to application of this common-law authority. As the 
courts below found, see 599 F. 2d, at 167-168, the sewer sys-
tems operated by petitioners include some 239 bypass or 
overflow points from which raw sewage is discha~r=-;':g 'e""d::i:d'."=i=r~ec~t~l '----~-
into Lake Michigan or into rivers that flow rnto the lake. 
In a single month in 1976, discharge from 11 of the 239 dis-
crete overflow points amounted to some 646 million gallons 
of untreated sewage. Ibid. The trial court determined that 
these untreated fecal wastes, containing billions of pathogenic 
- -
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bacteria and viruses, are periodically transported by prevail-
ing currents into the Illinois waters of Lake Michigan. The 
court further found that the presence of these pathogens in 
Illinois waters poses a significant risk of injury to Illinois 
residents, threatening to contaminate drinking water supplies 
and infect swimmers. 27 
Pursuant to the Act, publicly owned treatment works then 
in existence must apply "secondary treatment as defined by 
the Administrator" as of July 1, 1977. §§ 301 (b)(l)(B) , 
304 (d)( l); 33 U.S. C. §§ 1311 (b)(l)(B) , 1314 (d)(l) .28 
No provision of the Act explicitly addresses the discharge 
of raw sewage into public waters from overflow points. In-
deed, Congress in 1977 expressed concern that combined 
sewer overflows were a significant source of untreated sew-
age polluting the Nation's waters, and it commissioned a 
study of the problem with a view toward possible further 
legislation.29 While the Administrator has issued regulations 
that define secondary treatment in terms of certain minimum 
levels of effluent quality, he also has acknowledged that com-
bined sewer overflows raise special concerns that must be 
resolved on a case-by-case basis. 30 This record demonstrates 
27 There is little to be gained by undertaking an extensive review of 
the record evidence on these points. The Court of Appeals did this and 
concluded that the findings at trial were not clearly erroneous. I see no 
reason to disturb the Court of Appeals'· view of the evidence. 
28 Congress in 1977 amended the Act to permit the Administrator to 
grant extensions of the 1977 deadline under certain conditions. See Pub. 
L. 9'5-217, §§ 44, 45, 91 Stat. 1584, 33 U.S. C. §§ 1311 (h) and (i) (1976 
ed., Supp. III). 
29 Pub. L. 95-217, § 700, 91 Stat. 1608. See S. Rep. No. 95-370, p. 81 
( 1977). The study was issued in October 1978. See EPA, Report to 
Congress on Control of Combined Sewer Overflow in the United States. 
30 See 40 CFR §§ 133.102 and 133.103 ( 1980). In addition, sewers 
and pipes that do not lead to a treatment facility are not considered 
"publicly owned treatment works" for purposes of § 301, 33 U. S. C. 
§ 1311. See 40 CFR § 122.3, p. 70 (1980). In the absence of technology-
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that both Congress and the Administrator recognized the ·in-
adequacy of the statutory scheme. It surely does not show 
that these responsible parties intended no role for the fed-
eral common law. · 
The lower courts in this case carefully evaluated the reg-
ulatory systems developed by each State to deal with the 
overflow problem. It was determined that the standards 
promulgated under the Illinois regulatory scheme were more 
stringent than those developed by the Wisconsin agency or 
imposed on petitioners under the Wisconsin state court judg-
ment. See 599 F. 2d, at 171-173. The District Court's 
order imposed standards that reflected the more rigorous ap-
pro:;tch adopted in Illinois to restore and protect Illinois 
waters. 31 The Court of Appeals noted that Wisconsin had 
allowed petitioners more time in which to eliminate or "cor-
rect'' the overflow problem, but that petitioners conceded the 
feasibility of complying with the District Court's deadlines. 
Id., at 172, 177. In my view, the Court of Appeals acted re-
sponsibly and in a manner wholly consistent with the com-
mon-law jurisdiction envisioned by the Court in Illinois v. 
Milwaukee. 
istrator mandates an individualized analysis by each s~·stem that seeks 
federal assistance. See EPA, Benefit Analysis for Combined Sewer Over-
flow Control 3 ( 1979). 
31 While the Wisconsin permit-grantmg agency and the Wisconsin state 
courts devised one approach to regulating combined sewer overflows in 
the Milwaulrne system, this alone does not establish that the applicable 
legal standard under federal common law is the one adopted by Wis-
consin. To hold otherwise would in effect nullify a neighboring State's 
more stringent pollution control standards even in circumstances where, 
as here , a significant risk of harm to the neighboring State's citizenry 
has been established; if a polluting State is not violating its own ap-
proved standards, a neighboring State with higher standards then has no 
recourse under the Act. It is in precisely this context that the Court 
recognized the significance of federal common law. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 
406 U. S., at 107-108. 
- -
79-408-DISSENT 
MILWAUKEE v. ILLINOIS 
IV 
21 
There is one final disturbing aspect to the Court's decision. 
Bv eliminating the federal common law of nuisance in this ,.. . rt. \.\ 
area, the Court in effect is encouragin recourse to state law 
wherever the federal statutory scneme is perceived to offer 
inadequate protection against pollution from outside the 
State, either in its enforcement standards or in the remedies 
afforded. This recourse is now inevitable under a statutory 
scheme that accords a sig11ificant role to State as well as fed-
eral law. But in the present context it is also unfortunate, 
since it undermines the Court's prior conclusion that it is 
federal rather than state law that should govern the regula-
tion of i,~on. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 
U. S. , at 102. Instead of promoting a more uniform federal 
approach to the problem of alleviating interstate pollution, 
I fear that today's decision will lead States to turn to their 
own courts for statutory or common-law assistance in filling 
the interstices of the federal statute. Rather than encourage 
such a prospect, I would adhere to the principles clearly 
enunciated in Illinois v. Milwau,kee , and affirm the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals. 
- -
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No. 79-408 City of Milwaukee v. Illinois 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
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